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Turkmenistan is slowly emerging from decades of darkness. President 
Gurbanguli Berdymukhamedov has vowed to modernize the country by 
encouraging the uptake of new technology for economic development and 
more efficient governance. Hundreds of thousands of Turkmen citizens are 
now online. 
However, the country faces serious challenges as it prepares to go digital. 
Infrastructure is primitive, and public access is fully controlled by a state-
owned monopoly. Slow speeds, exorbitant pricing, and technological illit-
eracy all constitute major hurdles. 
Authorities are moving to address the capacity problem, but Turkmenistan’s 
repressive regime is unlikely to relinquish its stranglehold on cyberspace ac-
cess and content. All media – including the internet – are closely controlled. 
State censorship and surveillance are significant, as are intimidation tactics 
that encourage user self-censorship. 
This study highlights the ambivalent policies and practices that have left 
Turkmenistan mired in the digital doldrums, torn between its desire to join 
the worldwide web and its compulsion to control cyberspace. 
KEY TAKEAWAYS
The internet presents a novel challenge for Turkmen authorities. On the one 
hand, the government is keen to promote internet expansion for develop-
ment; on the other, officials are increasingly wary of its potential as an 
outlet for dissent. 
Positive steps have been taken. Officials have pledged to improve access, 
infrastructure and services, establish e-government and provide internet 
resources in education. They have also authorized internet cafés and con-
nections for private citizens. 
Internet uptake remains limited. Official estimates stand at a mere 2.2%. 
Access is minimal outside major urban centres. Private internet connections 
are extremely expensive and slow. The state’s 15 internet cafés are closely 
monitored, and offer slow connections.
Mobile phones, used by some 63% of the population, are important points 
of access, but uptake has been stymied. Unofficial estimates place mobile in-
ternet access penetration at 14% (700,000 users). Mobile access is cheaper 
and faster than fixed-line service, but suffered a significant setback when the 
government revoked the licence for MTS, a major Russian mobile provider. 
The licence was restored in August 2012, but overall access remains con-
strained.
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Demand for internet access appears to be robust. Indications are found in the 
rapid rise in internet use, the striking growth in mobile subscriptions, popular 
unrest over a lack of new mobile subscriptions, and high demand at foreign-
sponsored internet sites (which provide fast and powerful satellite connections). 
The only licensed Internet Service Provider is state-run TurkmenTelekom. The 
state’s de facto monopoly hinders progress, with slow speeds and astronomi-
cal prices for access. It also ensures that officials can control and monitor how 
citizens use the internet. 
Authorities control cyberspace through content-blocking, surveillance, and severe 
penalties. Blocking is selective and inconsistent. Many, but not all, opposition 
sites are blocked, as are independent news sites that carry local news and various 
social media sites. At the same time, major news sites, social media and a popular 
commercial circumvention solution remain uncensored and available. Filtering is 
applied through straightforward IP and domain blacklists. Technical testing did 
not reveal any instances of tampering with the Domain Name System. Users are 
aware the government is potentially watching every online move; journalists are 
closely tracked. There is compelling anecdotal evidence of harsh reprisals against 
users who transgress government dictates.
Netizens cope by limiting their activities and views. Turkmen cyberspace is 
mostly social. Netizens use the internet primarily to keep in touch with friends 
and share information. International platforms are largely irrelevant, but Russian 
social networks are popular.
Blogging is discouraged but legal. So far, Turkmen blog mostly for fun. Blogging 
is growing in popularity, although many hosting sites are blocked. Political blogs 
are effectively non-existent. Most blogs share information and views on innocu-
ous topics. 
Mild online dissent appears to be somewhat tolerated. Evidence suggests users 
have expressed mild political opinions online without repercussions. However, 
few people risk posting serious political criticisms online.
Censored information is sometimes shared, despite the risks. Three common 
methods include: emailing attachments that contain forbidden information to 
trusted friends; posting translated news to Turkmen chat sites; using microblogs.
News and information are still derived mainly from television. Many indepen-
dent news websites are blocked and slow speeds make routine access onerous.
Most users are unaware of circumvention tools. Most users know the state 
blocks some sites and monitors online posts, but few know of circumvention 
tools or how to use them. 
At the moment, there is no evidence that officials have targeted those citizens 
who do use circumvention tools. 
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TABLE 1. TURKMENISTAN: AT A GLANCE
    
Indicator Value Source
Population 5 million 2011, Economist Intelligence Unit
GNI per capita $3,967 U.S. 2010, World Development Indicators
Adult literacy rate 100%* 2009, World Development Indicators
Fixed telephone landlines 10% 2012, Paul Budde Communication Pty. Ltd.
Mobile phone users 63.4% 2010, International Telecommunications Union
Internet users
(likely does not include mobile users)
2.2% 2010, International Telecommunications Union
(estimate)
Internet users - mobile access 14% Field Source 
(estimate)
EIU Democracy Index 1.72 
(165th out of 167 countries)




(lowest possible rating for both 
political rights and civil liberties)
2011, Freedom House
*Figure based on Turkmenistan government estimate. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
SecDev Analyticsiv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report was prepared by analysts from The SecDev Group, based on research conducted between  
October 2011 and September 2012. The SecDev Group employs a mixed methodology that includes 
qualitative, quantitative, technical, and ethnographic research methods. Core research for this report, 
which consisted of a review of public databases and statistical sources, open- and gray-source research, 
key informant interviews, and the management of infield sources and analysis, was carried out by Elinor 
Buxton, with support from Natalie Ratcliffe. Deirdre Collings and Kelly Patterson provided editorial 
supervision and quality control. Graphic design, layout, and desktop publishing was done by Madeline 
Charlton. Rafal Rohozinski provided overall guidance and management for the research and production of 
this report.
The SecDev Group (Analytics) is deeply grateful for the assistance of several key anonymous sources in 
sourcing the research and analysis presented in this report. Turkmenistan is a closed society, and obtaining 
accurate data on communications, surveillance, and the internet is difficult, and can put researchers at 
considerable risk. Where possible, we have acknowledged the significant inputs of our field-based sources, 
while doing our best to protect their identities and security. Tattu Mambetalieva and the team at the Civic 
Initiative for Internet Policy in Kyrgyzstan and Eurasia.net provided valuable support for our infield 
research efforts. Finally, we are also grateful to the journalists at neweurasia.net, and in particular the 
contributions of Annasoltan, whose work in this area is both credible and informative.
This report also benefited from research and information conducted by a number of public research 
organizations. These include, but are not limited to, the OpenNet Initiative, Freedom House, Reporters 
without Borders, and Psiphon Inc.
This report was commissioned and financially supported by the Open Society Foundations. The Open 
Society Foundations’ activities in Eurasia and Turkmenistan provide support for groups such as SecDev 
that are conducting research into democratic transitions in the societies and countries of the former Soviet 
Union. Working with local communities in more than 100 countries, the Open Society Foundations support 
justice and human rights, freedom of expression, public health, and education, and help build vibrant and 
tolerant democracies whose governments are accountable to their citizens. Please see the OSF website at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/.
Any errors and omissions in this report are the sole responsibility of The SecDev Group.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive summary and key takeaways     i
Acknowledgements   iv
Overview       1
1. Political context: Internet stops and starts     3
2. Roadblocks on the information highway: Challenges of access    7
3. Living with Big Brother: State controls and how netizens cope  11
Summary    16
Appendix 1. Summary of research sources  17
Appendix 2. Internet and mobile rates  18 
Endnotes    19
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Turkmenistan’s fibre-optic links to the global internet    2 
Figure 2. Turkmenistan’s mobile Monopoly game    6
Figure 3. By the numbers    9
Figure 4. Ertir Chat Forum  14
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Turkmenistan: At a glance   iii
LIST OF BOXES
Box 1.  Mobile service: Explosive growth; stymied potential    5
Box 2.  Two steps forward, one step back: Turkemnistan’s journey into cyberspace  10
Box 3.  Blocked URLs in Turkmenistan  12
1NEITHER HERE NOR THERE:TURKMENISTAN’S DIGITAL DOLDRUMS
OVERVIEW
Regarded by human-rights groups as one of the 
most repressive regimes in the world, Turkmenistan 
remains extremely insular. The right to freedom 
of expression and religion is close to non-existent, 
and human-rights defenders face severe repression, 
including imprisonment and forced labour.1 Inde-
pendent human rights and election monitors are 
regularly denied access to the country, perpetuat-
ing a lack of transparency in both the judicial and 
electoral processes. 
In this closed, tightly controlled environment, the 
internet presents a novel problem for Turkmen 
authorities. On the one hand, the government 
is keen to promote internet uptake in order to 
modernize the nation; on the other, officials are 
increasingly wary of its potential as an outlet for 
dissent.
In keeping with this ambivalence, the government 
has taken a two-steps-forward, one-step-back 
approach. It has promised ambitious infrastructure 
improvements and boldly broadened access over 
the past five years. At the same time, state controls 
continue to deter users and stymy development.
This report presents an overview of the political, 
technological, and social facets of Turkmenistan’s 
current internet environment. Due to the lack of 
publicly available data in Turkmenistan, finding 
credible documented information is difficult. Much 
of this report is based on information obtained by 
field sources with solid, first-hand knowledge of the 
country: journalists, bloggers, and computer experts 
who are either Turkmen or have worked extensively 
in Turkmenistan. In order to protect these sources 
from reprisals, this report does not reveal their 
identifying details. The report also draws on data 
from secondary sources, including technical articles, 
corporate reports and NGO studies (see Appendix 
1).
This study is written in three parts:
•	 Political Context: Internet Starts and Stops pro-
vides an overview of the country’s official steps 
towards going online;
•	 Roadblocks on the information highway con-
siders the challenges of internet access in the 
country; 
•	 Living with Big Brother outlines state control 
tactics (censorship and surveillance) and how 
Turkmen netizens cope. 
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FIGURE 1. TURKMENISTAN’S FIBRE-OPTIC LINKS TO THE GLOBAL INTERNET
Source: The Central Asian Research and Education Network
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1. POLITICAL CONTEXT: INTERNET STARTS AND STOPS
Turkmenistan’s authoritarian political system is 
deeply entrenched. In 2012, President Gurbanguli 
Berdymukhamedov was re-elected in a landslide 
victory that is widely regarded as rigged, reportedly 
receiving 97 per cent of the popular vote.2 
Democratic reforms are unlikely. Turkmenistan 
ranks 165th of 167 countries on the Democracy 
Index, narrowly beating Chad and North Korea.3 
The country’s human-rights record is dismal. 
Political dissidents risk imprisonment, torture, and 
enforced disappearance, and are subject to arbitrary 
travel bans. There are “draconian restrictions” on 
the rights to freedom of expression and association, 
and external human-rights monitors are not allowed 
into the country.4 Freedom of the media is utterly 
non-existent. 
Not surprisingly, Turkmenistan has been slow to 
open its doors to the global internet. 
NIYAZOV’S INTERNET:  
SLOW AND RESTRICTED
The government took the first step toward going 
online in the 1990s under former President Sapar-
murat Niyazov, when Siemens and Alcatel were 
invited to develop the country’s internet. Through-
out Niyazov’s reign, the internet existed mostly for 
the use of government, academia, foreign diplomats, 
and foreign-owned businesses. There was little 
public internet access except at centres sponsored by 
foreign aid programs. 
In 2000, Niyazov banned the country’s four private 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), solidifying the 
monopoly of state-controlled TurkmenTelekom. 
In 2002, he banned internet cafés, after an alleged 
presidential-assassination attempt.5
In 2003, however, the government launched a long-
term plan for social and economic development that 
identified telecommunications infrastructure as a 
top priority. Among other goals, the plan called for 
the addition of 1.8 million phone lines by 2020 – 
the number needed for every household to have a 
phone.6 Progress has been slow. As of 2010, only 
some 10% of Turkmenistan’s 5 million citizens had 
basic fixed-line phone service, a mere 2% increase 
since the plan’s launch.7 
Also in 2003, Turkmenistan’s higher-education 
and research sectors (members of TuRENA8) were 
connected to the NATO-funded Virtual Silk High-
way via a 708-km stretch of fibre-optic cable and a 
satellite set up in Ashgabat and linked to Hamburg, 
Germany.9 A year later, the cable was extended to 
the country’s eastern and western regions, providing 
service to major cities such as Turkmenbashi and 
Balkanabat.10 
Despite these targeted efforts, connections remained 
slow and unreliable. Key beneficiaries – such as 
university staff – routinely resorted to using the 
faster, satellite-based services provided by foreign 
agencies such as the U.S. Embassy, United Nations, 
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, among others.11
By 2007, Turkmenistan had four international fibre-
optic lines12 (see Figure 1) These connect to: 
•	 Uzbek Telecom in the north, near Dashoguz; 
•	 Iran (and farther to Frankfurt via the Trans-
Asia-Europe line) near Ashgabat; 
•	 Uzbek Telecom in the east, near Turkmanbat; 
•	 Turkmenbashi in the west, which is to be con-
nected to Azerbaijan’s AzTerraNet via a cable 
under the Caspian Sea.13 
Niyazov also initiated mobile service in the country, 
by granting an exclusive licence to a private 
provider, U.S.-based Barash Communications 
Technologies (BCT), in 1996. He issued a second 
licence to state-owned TM Cell (also called Altyn 
Asyr) in 2004. The following year, BCT was taken 
over by a Russian company, Mobile Telesystems 
(MTS), which began an ambitious expansion of 
services in Turkmenistan.14 Over the next six years, 
the mobile penetration rate skyrocketed, almost all 
of it driven by MTS. 
In 2011, MTS was forced to shut down when its 
licence was revoked by Niyazov’s successor. (see Box 
1, p. 5). In August 2012, the government reversed 
course and MTS resumed services. By September, 
the number of subscribers had exceeded 500,000.15 




INTERNET FOR ALL (…SORT OF)
Upon his election in 2007, President Berdymukham-
edov vowed to bring Turkmenistan’s internet into 
the 21st century. He has also stated that internet ac-
cess is the right of every Turkmen citizen.16 In fact, 
many of his policy pronouncements on telecom-
munications development give a glimmer of hope to 
Turkmenistan, at least in terms of potential internet 
access.17 And he has taken some bold steps.
In 2009, he launched a new initiative to increase 
infrastructure capacity: the Central Asian Re-
search and Education Network18 (CAREN) project. 
Funded mostly by the European Commission’s Eu-
rope Aid Cooperation Office (AIDCO),19 the project 
replaces the Virtual Silk Highway, establishing 
broadband connections for universities and research 
institutes via fibre-optic cables linked to GÉANT, 
the European data network.20
The government reports that researchers now have 
much faster internet access than before. The web-
site of the Academy of Sciences of Turkmenistan 
claims there are some 12,000 users on the TuRENA 
network, which has a download speed of 13 Mbps 
– significantly faster than the top speed for ADSL 
access in Turkmenistan.21
For the general public, however, it is another story. 
Sources report woefully low download speeds for 
all forms of internet access, and the country’s total 
bandwidth remains extremely limited. Engineers 
report that the total bandwidth for Turkmenistan 
is 650 Mbps. While this is a huge increase from the 
country’s 0.26 Mbps in 2000, it is still relatively 
small compared to that of neighbouring states. 
Uzbekistan, for instance, had 1,250 Mbps as of 
October 2009.22
Berdymukhamedov’s other internet-related policy 
movements – both forward and back – include:
•	 lifting the ban on internet cafés (2007);23
•	 permitting home internet connections for 
private citizens (2008);24
•	 hindering the growth of mobile phone 
service and 3G internet access by suspending 
Russian-owned MTS’s licence (2010). At the 
time, MTS had about 2.5 million subscribers 
(about half the population), its services 
covered 83% of the country, and it was 
planning to offer 3G service. By contrast, 
state-owned TM Cell had less than half a 
million customers, and its coverage was 
centred on Ashgabat and its surroundings.25 
In 2011, MTS was shut down altogether, 
leaving TM Cell as the sole mobile provider, 
despite its low capacity (see Box 1, p. 5, and 
Figure 2, p. 6). MTS has since regained its 
licence and as of September 2012, it had 
reactivated 500,000 subscribers;26
•	 introducing e-government, with plans for 
some 80 ministries and government agencies 
to have their own websites.27 A new IT-
focused government department was also 
created (2011);
•	 signing a resolution to improve TM Cell’s 
poor service (2012).28 He also threatened 
to sack the Minister of Information and 
Communications if the service did not 
improve.29
•	 vowing to integrate computers into the 
education system (2011). Lenovo notebooks 
worth $26 million U.S. have been reportedly 
distributed to 100,000 first graders.30 
(While this move suggests a commitment 
to creating Turkmenistan’s first “wired” 
generation, a lack of connectivity means that 
very few classrooms will actually be online); 
•	 supporting the Mejlis’ (parliament’s) efforts 
to use ICTs to strengthen institutional 
capacity, legislative processes, control 
functions and public outreach;31 and 
encouraging the introduction of an 
electronic voter registration system by the 
Central Election Commission;32 and,
•	 reiterating support for the 2020 strategic 
plan, which would increase the fibre-optic 
network by 2,500 km and connect core 
urban centres.33
The government has made some decidedly internet-
friendly gestures in recent years. Yet Turkmenistan 
remains a highly restrictive environment for both 
internet access and internet content, as the state 
continues to maintain tight control on both fronts. 
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Box 1.  Mobile service: Explosive growth; stymied potential
In 2010, Turkmenistan could have revolutionized internet access with a move to fast, affordable 3G 
mobile service. But just as this opportunity was announced by the Russian provider MTS, Turkmen 
authorities shut it down.
Between 2006 and 2010, Turkmenistan’s mobile service penetration rate skyrocketed from 4% to some 
63%. Mobile’s explosive growth was mostly driven by the Russian provider MTS. By August 2010, its 
services covered 83% of the country, with an estimated 2.5 million subscribers. By contrast, state-owned 
TM Cell was available only in major cities, with about 400,000 customers.
In late 2009, TM Cell customers began receiving a very basic 3G service. But service was poor and 
unreliable, and uptake was reportedly low. 
In 2010, MTS announced plans to offer 3G services. Given MTS’s extensive capacity, wide coverage and 
massive customer base, this move would have created a cheap, fast and nearly nationwide option for 
internet-capable mobile service.
However, within weeks of MTS’s announcement, the government suspended its licence. In January 2011, 
MTS operations were shut down altogether, with authorities stating its five-year contract had expired.
TM Cell was left as the sole mobile service provider in the country, despite its extremely limited range 
and low capacity. The company struggled to absorb MTS’s customer base. In fact, demand was so 
high that officials reportedly suspended the distribution of SIM cards temporarily in April 2011, with the 
exception of cards for public officials and foreigners. 
In a move designed to address the lack of wireless capacity, the Ministry of Communications signed 
contracts with Huawei and Nokia Siemens in April 2011 to upgrade and expand TM Cell’s mobile 
network. By August 2012 the government had once more changed course. MTS’s licence was restored, 
and within a month it had reactivated over 500,000 user accounts. 
No data are available publicly on how many mobile customers have internet access. Estimates for this 
report suggest a rate of about 14% of the population, with 6% having 3G service. 
Sources: Freedom House. 2011. Nations in Transit 2011; Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd. 2012. Turkmenistan: Tele-
coms, Mobile and Internet; Turkmenistan.ru. 2011. “Huawei and Nokia Siemens networks to increase capacity of national 
cellular operator Altyn Asyr.” 7 April 2012; Annasoltan. 2012. “The Turkmenet’s not over until the fat lady sings!” in NewEur-
asia. 27 February 2012; ITU. 2010
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FIGURE 2. TURKMENISTAN’S MOBILE MONOPOLY GAME
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2. ROADBLOCKS ON THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY: 
CHALLENGES OF ACCESS
TURKMEN NETIZENS: NOT SO MANY, 
BUT DEMAND IS THERE
Official statistics find only 2.2% of the Turkmen 
population online.34 But this number probably does 
not include mobile internet access. A field source 
with knowledge of the area estimates mobile inter-
net users to number some 700,000, with 300,000 of 
those using 3G services.35 By these numbers, some 
14% of the population has mobile access.
While Turkmenistan’s internet penetration rate 
remains much lower than that of its neighbours,36 
it has risen considerably since the Niyazov era, 
when few Turkmen citizens other than government 
employees had access to the internet.
There are also clear signs that demand for internet 
access is robust. By 2010, there were more than 20 
times as many internet users as in 200037 (based 
on the low official statistic), and the rapid increase 
in the number of mobile subscribers is particularly 
striking, with growth rates exceeding 200% in some 
years. In fact, officials reportedly had to call in the 
military to quell popular unrest in larger cities over 
a lack of new mobile subscriptions after MTS shut 
down.38 
Public internet centres sponsored by foreign gov-
ernments and organizations report strong demand. 
These centres offer fast and powerful satellite 
connections, a service for which users – research-
ers, government employees, state journalists, and 
the regular public – are willing to wait in line.39 By 
way of example, the Information Resource Center 
(IRC) at the U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat reported 
users queuing for 30 minutes or more to use their 
terminals.40  Their monthly usage rose 50% between 
2007 and 2008.41
Overall, indications suggest there is a burgeon-
ing potential market of users who are poised to 
go online as soon as access and service improve in 
Turkmenistan. But those improvements will likely 
be a long time coming.
 
The major stumbling block is the TurkmenTelekom 
monopoly, which sits at the strangled heart of Turk-
menistan’s slow, expensive, censored, and surveilled 
internet.42
TURKMENISTAN’S STATE MONOPOLY: 
NOT READY FOR PRIME TIME
TurkmenTelekom, parent company of TM Cell, 
has long been the only authorized Internet Service 
Provider in the country, even though the price of in-
ternet access skyrocketed when the monopoly took 
over in 2000 from the four independent providers 
that had been operating in Turkmenistan.43
The government maintains direct control over the 
company. The director of TurkmenTelekom reports 
directly to the Cabinet, bypassing the Ministry of 
Communications, which is nominally in charge of 
the ISP, as well as all other related industries, such 
as radio and television broadcasting.44
Thus, despite President Berdymukhamedov’s various 
initiatives to improve internet access, it is Turkmen-
Telekom that has set the pace for internet develop-
ment, and that pace has been agonizingly slow, as 
the cash-strapped company makes do with primitive 
infrastructure, slow connectivity speeds, and limited 
geographical range. 
Meanwhile, the lack of competition has led to astro-
nomically high prices for some services.
PRIVATE ACCESS: PRICEY, SLOW, AND RARE
The government began allowing private internet ac-
cess in 2008, but uptake has been slow. Satisfactory 
connections are rare outside the country’s capital, 
astronomically expensive as well as slow, and re-
quire a daunting registration process.
Connectivity is essentially non-existent beyond 
Ashgabat and some major towns. This is a major 
obstacle, given that some 50% of the population 
lives in rural areas.45
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ADSL internet access costs a staggering $7,000 U.S. 
per month for the highest speed. Even at the slowest 
speed, an ADSL connection with no limits on traffic 
costs more than half of the average monthly income 
of $330 U.S.46 In this respect, the pricing policies set 
by the state-owned operator appear to run counter 
to the official goal of forging ahead with plans for 
e-government.47 (For the monthly subscription rates 
in both U.S. dollars and the Turkmen currency, 
manats, see Appendix 2.)
Hardware is also expensive. A basic desktop com-
puter, for example, costs the equivalent of almost 
two months’ salary for the average Turkmen citi-
zen.48 
Download speeds are extremely slow, estimated 
at some 72 kbps.49 By comparison, neighbouring 
Afghanistan’s average speed is 150 kbps – more 
than twice as fast.50 Ironically, many websites cre-
ated as part of the regime’s e-government efforts are 
effectively inaccessible. Using the most affordable 
private-connection plan, it would take about seven 
minutes to download the website for the country’s 
Chamber of Commerce (see Figure 3, p. 9).
Acquiring access is also an administrative nightmare 
that can take several months.51 Users must register 
their passports with TurkmenTelekom, agree to re-
frain from a wide range of online activities, such as 
accessing websites containing untrue or defamatory 
information (a definition understood to include op-
position websites), and even promise not to use foul 
language. A signature from the local police station is 
also required.52 
STATE-RUN INTERNET CAFÉS:  
UNDER SURVEILLANCE
Re-opened in 2007, state-run internet cafés offer 
higher speeds than most people can afford through 
home access. The difference is relative, of course. 
In 2008, there were reports of webmail taking an 
hour to open. This situation may have improved, 
as the connections at internet cafés were recently 
upgraded. Hourly rates are also less expensive than 
monthly home-access plans, estimated at some $1 
U.S. to $3 U.S an hour, although this is still a signifi-
cant sum for the average citizen.53
There are only 15 state-run internet cafés in the 
whole country, all of them in major cities.54 State 
surveillance makes many people wary of using the 
cafés. Customers must show their passport or other 
identification and fill out a questionnaire giving 
personal data and explaining why they want to use 
the internet. Observers have noted, however, that 
controls are inconsistently applied. At some cafés, 
staff appear indifferent to state directives, while oth-
ers demonstrate considerable zeal. Users of the U.S. 
Embassy’s public internet outlet have also stated 
that they avoid internet cafés because they believe 
they are being monitored.55
In 2008, observers concurred that most cafés had 
very few users.56 An exception seemed to be in two 
particular locations – one in Ashgabat and another 
in Mary City. The reasons for the higher traffic in 
these locales remain unexplained.57
MOBILE ACCESS: CHEAP BUT SLOW, WITH 
LIMITED RANGE
Mobile access is a key avenue for internet use in 
Turkmenistan, including access via mobile devices 
connected to laptops. Engineers report that TM Cell 
leases a 300 Mb/s channel from TurkmenTelekom 
to provide internet access via smartphones.
Dramatically cheaper than fixed lines, mobile 
phones are used by some 63% of the population,58 
and the addition of internet access is relatively inex-
pensive. As already noted, our field source estimates 
some 14% of the Turkmen population accesses the 
internet via mobile service, with about 6% access-
ing 3G services (which should provide full internet 
access in theory, but falls far short of this in reality 
– see below).
According to our sources, a SIM card from TM 
Cell costs about $6 U.S. in addition to the credit 
required for making calls or texting. The company 
offers a variety of relatively affordable plans for 
online access, ranging from a minimum daily fee 
of $0.10 U.S. plus $0.02 per MB, to a daily fee of 
$0.04 U.S. and $0.02 U.S. per MB for 3G service 
(see Appendix 2).59
Smartphones themselves are expensive, but most 
remain more affordable than personal computers. 
Nokia models that cost from $180 to $240 U.S. are 
the most common. Mobiles running the Android 
platform are also increasingly popular. Sought-after 
models include the Samsung Galaxy, Sony Ericsson 
Xperia, and various HTC phones. These are, how-
ever, more pricey. The most desirable HTC phones 
cost $650 U.S., while older models are available for 
$550 U.S. 
Most mobile subscribers make full use of 2G ser-
vices such as messaging: people often exchange their 
mail.ru agent username rather than phone numbers, 
according to a prominent Turkmen blogger.
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TM Cell’s coverage is extremely limited when it 
comes to 3G service (see Box 1 above). Even large 
towns such as Abadan reportedly do not have full 
internet access via mobile devices. And connections 
remain notoriously slow. When 3G service first be-
came available at the end of 2009, the connectivity 
rate was only 56k/second, which ruled out standard 
services like internet television, YouTube video 
content, and other video content. In essence, TM 
Cell’s 3G service worked at about the same speed 
as dialup connections from home.60 Field sources61 
state that the speed for 3G service can now reach up 
to 1 Mbps, but does so only at low-volume times of 
the day, and only in well-serviced locations.
With the closure of MTS in 2011, the total number 
of mobile subscribers declined.62 Sources for this 
study reported that overloading became a chronic 
problem with TM Cell’s service as it struggled to 
absorb MTS’s large subscriber base. These capac-
ity problems may have prompted the government’s 
decision to reinstate MTS’s licence in 2012.
FIGURE 3. BY THE NUMBERS
Sources for data: Paul Budde Communication Pty. Ltd.,  in-country sources,  
Pando Networks. All prices in U.S. dollars. Data as of March 2012
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Box 2.  Two steps forward, one step back: Turkmenistan’s journey into cyberspace
In 2010, the OpenNet Initiative published a baseline study of Turkmenistan’s online environment. Since then, the 
country has taken a number of steps – both progressive and regressive – that have affected its digital development. 
Research carried out for this report provides a checklist of the country’s progress.
Snapshot: ONI report, 2008-2010 Update 2012 Comments
State control of all media 
Government control of fixed-line internet; 
all data pass through central hub
State control of mobile internet MTS forced to cease operations in 2010. Licence 
restored in August 2012. State retains tight  
control over all Internet access.
Telecom monopoly reports directly to cabinet
Penalty for insulting government representatives: 
Fines, forced labour and/or prison
Penalty for insulting president: 
5 years in prison
Penalty for expressing critical political opinion Mild political opinions tolerated, but self-censor-
ship still the rule
Internet users must register passports, pledge to 
respect restrictions, including ban on “defamatory” 
(i.e. opposition) websites
Pervasive filtering of political websites, including 
foreign news and Russian-language websites
Selective filtering of social, conflict/security websites Filtering slightly less systematic than before, ac-
cording to anecdotal reports
Private connections slow, expensive
Mobile internet range limited, speeds slow   
              (slight 
         improvement)
Mobile service affordable, used by 63% of  
Turkmen. An estimated 14% have mobile internet 
access, including 6% with 3G service
Internet cafés: 15 outlets, generally unpopular, slow 
speeds, with overt state surveillance
Two cafés very crowded, according to U.S. diplo-
matic cable, indicating increased interest
Foreign outlets (e.g. embassies, hotels) offer fast 
internet access via satellite, but filter it 
to comply with government
Internet penetration rate (excluding mobile) 1.6%, 
very slow growth over time
Official rate for fixed-line access now 2.2%, 
excluding mobile
 (Sources: ONI report, Buddecomm, US embassy cables, ITU, SecDev source interviews)
step forward  no change  step backwardLegend:
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3. LIVING WITH BIG BROTHER:  
STATE CONTROLS AND HOW NETIZENS COPE
Turkmenistan’s authoritarian regime exerts aggres-
sive controls over the digital content available to its 
citizens. 
It deploys a range of basic tactics, from the blocking 
of opposition and foreign-language websites, to the 
imposition of harsh penalties for online dissent in 
order to intimidate users. 
For their part, Turkmen netizens are relatively 
unsophisticated in evading government censure.  
Few know how to use circumvention tools, and  
self-censorship is common.
CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE  
OF TURKMEN CYBERSPACE
“The government has sought to establish complete 
control of the internet to avoid any potential threat 
that unmonitored access may pose to the regime.”63 
So concludes the most systematic technical assess-
ment of Turkmenistan’s internet filtering and sur-
veillance practices to date, released by the OpenNet 
Initiative (ONI) in 2010 (see Box 2, p. 10).
The regime uses a range of control tactics: central-
ized media control, content-blocking, surveillance, 
and severe penalties.
CENTRALIZED MEDIA CONTROL
State-owned TurkmenTelekom holds a monopoly 
on all forms of internet access, from mobile phones 
to fixed-line connections. All internet channels pass 
through a central hub under government control, 
which enables both censorship and surveillance. 
As noted earlier, the general director of Turkmen-
Telekom reports directly to the Cabinet. The regime 
also controls all media outlets, including nominally 
independent outfits. Foreign stations are accessible 




Little is known about the exact mechanisms by 
which the Turkmen government implements internet 
censorship. There are no public records or official 
documents that describe who is tasked with decid-
ing what content to filter, nor is there a record of the 
process according to which sites are blocked. Avail-
able information is patchy at best, pieced together 
from accounts of former employees of Turkmen-
Telekom and organizations such as TuRENA, the 
Turkmen academic and research network.
Censorship is centralized – a logical conclusion 
given TurkmenTelekom’s monopoly and the high 
degree of control exercised by the presidency. There 
is no publicly disclosed list of blocked sites in Turk-
menistan. 
Some accounts claim that a key advisor to President 
Berdymukhamedow decides the exact content to be 
censored. These claims are unverified, but they are 
consistent with the selective and highly centralized 
pattern of censorship that is evident at the technical 
level. 
It also suggests that censorship practices may be dif-
ficult to scale as they require specific approvals from 
a very limited number of officials.
The available evidence suggests the system is simple 
and relies on predefined block lists. TurkmenTele-
kom possesses deep packet inspection technology 
that could be used to filter at the keyword level. 
However, testing carried out for this report suggest-
ed that blocking is straightforward and dependent 
on blocking IP addresses and domain names.
Technical testing carried out in July and August 
2012 revealed a highly selective and inconsistent 
pattern of censorship.
Blocked sites included popular blogs and news sites 
in Russian and Turkmen, as well as YouTube and 
CNN. The list of blocked sites included those of 
several prominent NGOs, such as the Soros  
Foundation and Human Rights Watch. 
At the same time, numerous other sites remained 
accessible. These included BBC, Amnesty Interna-
tional, Global Voices, blogger.com, Facebook, and 




































Box 3. Blocked URLs in Turkmenistan
Despite allegations ofampering with the domain 
name system, technical testing did not yield evidence 
of sites being deliberately redirected.
Some Turkmen confirm that they are able to access 
blocked sites via smartphones or the Opera Mini 
browser, which is popular in Turkmenistan because 
it compresses websites for faster downloads on slow 
networks. 
The ability to access blocked sites indicates that the 
Turkmen filtering system is not highly sophisticated. 
However, an article published by neweurasia on 
27 February 2012 said that Opera Mini had been 
blacked out.64 At the time of this report, the original 
version of Opera Mini was still blacked out, but 
new versions (Opera Mobila12 and Opera Mini7) 
with built-in proxies were in circulation among 
Turkmen netizens, according to Turkmen blogger 
Annasoltan. 
Censorship of circumvention technologies appears 
to be highly selective. The website of hidemyass.
com, a major commercial provider of secure 
tunneling technologies, is accessible, and provides 
free access to a number of open proxies. 
The extent to which these proxies are used in 
Turkmenistan remains unknown.65
SURVEILLANCE
The message is loud and clear to internet users in 
Turkmenistan: The government is potentially watch-
ing every online move. As noted, users accessing the 
internet from home or internet cafés must register 
their passports with TurkmenTelekom and agree to 
refrain from a wide range of online activities. 
Some sources for this report suggest monitoring in 
general is being applied less consistently than in the 
past. 
It is clear that journalists are still being closely fol-
lowed. All correspondents working for international 
media are monitored by the government, which has 
limited their internet access in some cases.66 
Sources say that the government monitors the in-
ternet connections of correspondents who work for 
services such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
and Annasoltan reports that when some journal-
ists unintentionally tried to access blocked sites, the 
National Security Ministry (DHM) called them in 
for questioning.67
Popular sites may also be monitored to some extent. 
Our sources report that a user on the www.teswirl-
er.com chat forum who made several posts related 
to Islam had his membership cancelled, and when 
the site was re-launched, his registration was denied. 
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SEVERE PENALITES
Under Articles 132 and 133 of the country’s Crimi-
nal Code, Turkmen who libel or insult government 
representatives may face fines, forced labour, or up 
to one year in prison. Insulting the president can 
result in a five-year prison term. 
While the Turkmen constitution guarantees its 
citizens “the right to freedom of conviction, the free 
expression of those convictions and the right to re-
ceive information,”68 this is clearly far from reality.
Online news reports that contravene official state-
ments may trigger harsh reprisals. 
In July 2011, an arms depot exploded in Abadan, 
destroying a large swath of the town. The govern-
ment announced 15 people had been killed. At the 
same time, internet access and mobile phone ser-
vices were blocked locally, seemingly to restrict the 
flow of unofficial information. 
A website called Chronicles of Turkmenistan (man-
aged by the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights) 
cited a substantially larger death toll of 1,382. It 
was subsequently hacked and its subscriber list 
exposed, presumably as a warning to others that 
government was tracking followers of the site.69
Similarly, when a freelance journalist, Dovletmyrat 
Yazkuliyev, published information that contradicted 
official reports on the disaster, he was sentenced to 
five years in prison. (International pressure led to his 
release three months later.)70
In its March 2011 report, Internet Enemies, Report-
ers Without Borders noted that human rights activ-
ist Umida Dzhumabaeva was forbidden to leave the 
country in July 2010 for having given information 
to opposition websites. 
In October that same year, the website of the Turk-
men Initiative for Human Rights was hacked after 
the satellite station K+ aired a television interview 
with the agency’s director, Farid Tukhbatullin.71
While an atmosphere of fear continues to prevail, 
anecdotal reports suggest Turkmen authorities now 
tolerate some very moderate dissent online. 
Many users have in recent years reportedly been 
able to express mild political opinions without fac-
ing repercussions, although pseudonyms are widely 
used.72 
HOW NETIZENS COPE: LIMITING  
ACTIVITY
Many socially active citizens want to use the 
internet to participate in discussions and obtain 
independent information about events in Turkmeni-
stan. However, the average Turkmen internet user 
is aware of the potential for censorship and surveil-
lance, as well as the harsh penalities for producing 
or accessing banned content. This awareness affects 
online behaviour and expectations. 
Overall, cyberspace is used primarily as a medium 
for social interaction. The internet is also used to 
share information and access news. Self-censorship 
is the norm, and most citizens express only mild 
political opinions in cyberspace, avoiding social and 
political participation altogether. Circumvention 
tool use remains quite limited. 
CYBERSPACE IS MOSTLY SOCIAL
With most citizens using the internet primarily as a 
recreational tool, social networks, forums, and chat 
sites such as odnoklassniki.ru, vkontakte.ru, and 
rambler.ru, are overwhelmingly popular, a Turkmen 
computer expert reports (although it is worth not-
ing that these are all actively monitored by Russian 
security services).
Data compiled by Google Insights on the most 
popular searches originating from Turkmenistan 
also reflect a primarily social orientation, as well as 
a keen interest in mobile services. 
Between April 2011 and April 2012, the most com-
mon search terms included several variations on 
“mobimeet.ru” (an online dating service) and the 
Russian social network, Odnoklassniki, as well as 
“Android,” “mail.ru,” “iPhone 5,” and “Nokia.” 
“Opera Mini,” a browser for mobile phones that 
is especially effective for slow networks, was also a 
popular choice.
Chat forums are particularly popular. Teswirler.com 
was reportedly one of the most popular Turkmen-
language websites, but was shut down permanently 
in July 2011. It has been replaced by ertir.com (see 
Figure 4, next page). Many citizens also use talyplar.
com, a popular discussion forum hosted in the U.S. 
that was originally designed for students. These 
chat forums are also routinely accessed from mobile 
phones.
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Popular search engines include Google, Bing, Yan-
dex poisk, mail.ru poisk, and Brothersoft (a soft-
ware and freeware download website).
BLOGGING IS MOSTLY FOR FUN
Blogging is discouraged, but not illegal. Nearly all 
hosting sites (such as WordPress) are blocked. For 
fear of intimidation from the authorities, political 
blogs are effectively non-existent. Instead, blogs 
function as a format for sharing information and 
knowledge about relatively innocuous topics, 
including technology, new companies, and saving 
money. 
Examples of personal blogs include: 








Despite the atmosphere of fear, some Turkmen do 
find ways to share censored information through 
the internet. According to our sources, three com-
mon avenues for information-sharing are:
•	 emailing attachments that contain for-
bidden literature or translated foreign 
literature to trusted friends; 
•	 posting translated news to Turkmen lan-
guage chat websites; and, 
•	 using microblogs such as the mail.ru 
agent.  
NEWS AND INFORMATION 
Given state controls, it is not surprising that the in-
ternet has not become an important source of infor-
mation and news for citizens. Many news websites 
are blocked and slow internet speeds make routine 
access onerous. There is one official online news site 
(the Turkmen State News Service) and two that have 
government links; however, they lack multimedia, 
sharing tools, links, and comment options. 
Popular news sites among Turkmen citizens (both 





FIGURE 4: ERTIR CHAT FORUM






•	 www.ehabar.com (link aggregator for 
Turkmen news) 
Our Turkmen sources say the most important 
source of information is not the internet but televi-
sion, through local, Russian or Turkish channels. 
Print media, while cheap, only contain information 
from state agencies; subscriptions are compulsory 
for government employees.73
Despite the importance of television – or perhaps 
because of it – Berdymukhamedov ordered that 
satellite dishes be removed from Ashgabat homes 
in August 2011 because they are “unsightly.” The 
Economist Intelligence Unit suggests that a more 
likely reason is that satellite television allows access 
to Russian and Turkish channels, thus offering an 
alternative to state-controlled cable television. While 
Turkmen television currently depends on Russian 
satellites, President Berdymukhamedov has said that 
the country plans to launch its own communica-
tions satellite.74 
CIRCUMVENTION: LACK OF AWARENESS 
MAKES FOR LIMITED USE
Low levels of computer literacy mean that most us-
ers are unfamiliar with the circumvention tools they 
could use to gain access to blocked information. 
According to Turkmen sources, the most popular 
circumvention tools include Ultrasurf, Hotspot 
Shield, or vTunnel, but most users use private proxy 
servers to access blocked sites.
Psiphon, which uses a popular Turkmen news ser-
vice as its landing page, is also used. In April 2012, 
there were over 80,000 page views of that news 
service using Psiphon.75
While there is little evidence of people being per-
secuted for circumventing internet controls (as 
opposed to posting dissenting content), a culture of 
fear persists. This is exacerbated by slow internet 
speeds: even elite proxy servers can take an exces-
sively long time to download data and they do not 
provide access to protected mail servers via SSL or 
HTTPS, according to a Turkmen computer expert. 
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SUMMARY
Keenly aware that the internet is critical to its future 
development, Turkmenistan stands poised at the 
threshold of the wired world. Officially, it has al-
ready stepped through the door, moving to improve 
connectivity and to broaden access by allowing 
home service, lifting the ban on internet cafés, and 
creating government websites.
In reality, though, it’s a different story. Maintaining 
tight control over the internet remains a key prior-
ity. The regime is extremely wary of the potential of 
the internet as a vector for dissent, and for poten-
tially exposing its secretive practices to unwelcome 
international scrutiny.
The regime’s efforts to pursue these contradictory 
goals have bogged down efforts to improve the 
country’s internet infrastructure and capacity, which 
remain extremely limited, and indeed are virtually 
non-existent outside of a handful of major urban 
centres, despite the fact that roughly half the popu-
lation of Turkmenistan lives in rural communities.
The state has a stranglehold on all forms of inter-
net service, from home access to mobile networks. 
Prices set by the state monopoly are staggeringly 
high for private connections; internet cafés are 
more affordable, but remain scarce and surveilled. 
Mobile service is comparatively inexpensive, but the 
state-owned service is chronically overloaded. Only 
research facilities enjoy improved internet access, 
through infrastructure provided by foreign aid.
Internet content is also restricted. Media are con-
trolled, activity monitored, reports sanitized, web-
sites blocked. The state ensures that only approved 
news reaches its citizens. Those who challenge the 
government online risk interrogation, imprisonment 
and even forced labour.
The state’s methods of monitoring and surveillance 
are basic; however, citizens’ knowledge of alterna-
tives such as circumvention tools is likewise mini-
mal. For the most part, netizens censor themselves, 
and avoid looking for trouble.
In short, Turkmenistan remains in a kind of online 
limbo, torn between the benefits of joining the wired 
world and the risks of losing control over informa-
tion and communication within its closed borders. 
One thing the government does seem to know, how-
ever, is that the internet is the gateway to modernity, 
and developing it is an important step towards 
escaping the fate of a forgotten country.
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APPENDIX 1. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH SOURCES 
Research for this report was conducted from October 2011 to July 2012. 
 
This report was prepared using multi-source, evidence-based methodology developed by The SecDev Group 
for research in challenging or difficult contexts. The research methods used include quantitative as well as 
qualitative measures, and were derived from a number of sources, including: 
•	 public research, such as that carried out by university and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) 
groups, including Freedom House, the OpenNet initiative, and other organizations active in the 
field of freedom of expression, censorship, and surveillance monitoring. Statistical information was 
obtained from the World Bank, United Nations, ITU, and national statistical agencies. 
•	 commercial research obtained for this for report from sources including BBC Monitoring, IDC, Paul 
Budde Communication, and Psiphon Inc. 
•	 open-source research, including blogs, alternative news sites, and forums and sources specializing in 
telecommunications, Turkmenistan, and political events in Turkmenistan and the CIS. 
•	 gray-source research that included access to confidential reports prepared by NGOs, the European 
Union, NATO, UNDP, World Bank, diplomatic reporting, and other third-party sources shared in 
confidence. These included technical reports and project documents pertaining to the development 
of the Turkmen internet infrastructure, and assessment reports of major infrastructure projects 
funded by NATO and the European Union. 
•	 interviews with key informants, carried out with knowledgeable individuals contacted and screened 
by SecDev researchers for this report. These included Turkmen journalists, computer experts, and 
an engineer retained by TurkmenTelekom. Informant research was carried out over several sessions, 
and information obtained by interviews was verified by additional sources and followup research. 
•	 technical testing, which was carried out in July 2012 in several locations in Turkmenistan. The 
testing used the Black Watch™ platform and measured results on fixed line, Wi-Fi, and mobile 
Internet services. The Black Watch testing protocol is consistent with ONI testing practices and 
methods. 
Wherever possible and practical, original sources have been cited. To protect the identity of individuals 
contributing to this report, some names and sources have been excluded, or attributed to the best available 
public source for this information. 
Any errors and omissions are the responsibility of The SecDev Group (Analytics).
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Tariff Cost per MB Cost per day Video call 
per minute
Additional notes






Connection fee is 5 manats
Incoming foreign calls cost 20  
tennesi per minute. Incoming calls from 







*100 tennesi = 1 manat
COST OF MOBILE SERVICES




Initial ADSL connection n/a 96.14 274.00
ADSL connection using sub-
scriber’s equipment
n/a 58.19 165.84
Unlimited traffic 64 kbps 213.16 607.50
128 kbps 426.32 1215.00
256 kbps 852.63 2430.00
512 kbps 1705.26 4860.00
1024 kbps 3410.53 9720.00
2048 kbps 6821.05 19440.00
Prepaid incoming traffic 64 kbps (up to 2 GB) 43.12 122.88
128 kbps (up to 5 GB) 125.75 358.40
256 kbps (up to 10 GB) 323.37 921.60
512 kbps (up to 20 GB) 862.32 2457.60
ADSL connection 96.14 274.00
ADSL connection using  
subscriber’s equipment
58.14 50.60
MONTHLY COST OF ADSL INTERNET ACCESS
APPENDIX 2. INTERNET AND MOBILE RATES
Source: http://online.tm
Source: Annasoltan
Rates as of March 2012
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